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WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT RATIFY THE 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
RICHARD G. WILKINS,* ADAM BECKER,** 
JEREMY HARRIS,*** AND DONLU THAYER**** 
INTRODUCTION 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly without a vote in 1989,1 is the “most 
comprehensive single treaty” ever to appear in the field of human rights.2  In 
the ten years following its entry into force in September 1990, the CRC has 
been ratified by 191 states – including every member of the United Nations 
(UN) except two.  The fact that the two non-ratifying nations are the United 
States and Somalia3 illustrates the paradoxes surrounding this remarkable 
instrument of international law, which, in spite of nearly universal ratification, 
continues to be the focus of intense debate. 
The CRC is the first purportedly legally binding international instrument to 
address children’s issues comprehensively.4  This fact guarantees that the CRC 
will command the careful attention of the world community.  Both the 1924 
Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the 1959 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child “laudably urge the protection and 
personal development of children and seek to improve children’s health, 
nutrition, safety, and education.”5  The CRC, however, seeks much wider 
influence; no mere declaration urging correct attitudes and benign protective 
 
* Richard G. Wilkins is a Professor of Law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University.  He is also the Managing Director of The World Family Policy Center at BYU. 
** Adam Becker received his J.D. Degree from the J. Reuben Clark Law School in 2003. 
*** Jeremy Harris is a J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 2004. 
**** Donlu Harris is a J.D. Candidates, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 2004. 
 1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 13, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 48,  
[hereinafter CRC]. 
 2. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: 
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 511 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
 3. Somalia signed the CRC on May 9, 2002, but has not yet fully ratified the convention. 
 4. David P. Stewart, Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. ON 
FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 162 (1998). 
 5. Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, Abandoning Children to their Autonomy: The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 449, 450 (1996). 
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behavior, the CRC charts “new territory”6 in the field of children’s rights, 
“moving beyond protection rights to choice rights for children.”7  In promoting 
a “new concept of separate rights for children with the Government accepting 
[the] responsibility of protecting the child from the power of parents”8 and 
“recogniz[ing] that children should have rights identical to adults,”9 the CRC 
comes squarely into conflict with traditional American notions of family and 
family law. 
Indeed, the refusal of the United States to ratify the treaty since President 
Clinton signed the CRC in February 1995 reflects not a “failure” as claimed by 
many CRC proponents,10 but, rather, the continuing uncertainty as to whether 
ratification of the CRC will help or harm children.  We fear the CRC may be 
bad for children because it creates expansive autonomy rights for children 
incapable of fully understanding – let alone wisely executing – those rights.  In 
turn, the CRC may be bad for the country because it calls for an exercise of 
congressional power beyond limits prescribed by the Constitution.11 
We will argue, therefore, against the ratification of the CRC by the United 
States on two grounds.  First, we believe the CRC’s newly minted autonomy 
rights are neither beneficial to children nor harmonious with traditional notions 
of salutary family life (as expressed, incidentally, in the Preamble to the CRC 
 
 6. U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: WORLD 
CAMPAIGN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS at 3, U.N.Doc. DPI/1101, U.N. Sales No. E.91.I.51 (1991). 
 7. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 450. 
 8. UNITED NATIONS 1994/95 PUBLICATIONS CATALOGUE at 64, quoted in Hafen & Hafen, 
supra note 5, at 450. 
 9. Michael Jupp, Confronting the Challenge of Realizing Human Rights Now: Rights of 
Children: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: An Opportunity for 
Advocates, 34 HOW. L.J. 15, 21 (1991) (noting, however, that there may be some exceptions, such 
as during wartime) 16, T. 14 , quoted in Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 451. 
 10. Stewart, supra note 4, at n. 9.  “Signature of a treaty does not entail a legal commitment 
to ratify but does obligate the signatory to refrain from taking actions which would defeat the 
object and purpose of the treaty.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 
art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 336 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, A GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” 
(Sharon Detrick ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) [hereinafter CRC,TP] (detailing the role 
of the U.S. delegation in drafting the Convention). 
 11. Ratification of the CRC with Reservations would not appear to be a viable option, given 
the nature of the U.S. objections.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
at 337.  “A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
formulate a reservation unless: (a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty 
provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may 
be made; or (c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty (emphasis added).” Id. 
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itself).12  Second, we have concluded that the CRC’s sweeping reconstruction 
of family life lies beyond Congress’ reach. 
I.  THE MODERN FAMILY AND THE PROLIFERATION OF RIGHTS 
The Preamble to the CRC echoes the 1948 call of the world community to 
protect the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society.”13  
According to some, however, this “natural” and “fundamental” group unit is no 
longer defined by reference to nature.  Rather, the “group unit” known as the 
family takes “various forms,”14 defined primarily by emerging gender and 
human rights discourse.15  This development is problematic.  “As one traces 
the evolution of the treatment of the family in UN documents, it is apparent 
that [this] human rights discourse has introduced fragmentation into policies 
regarding the family.”16 
In this new vision of the family, biological and hierarchical relationships 
are irrelevant.  The focus is not upon the family as a natural unit, but upon the 
free association of autonomous individuals, regardless of kinship, gender or 
age.  It is within this context that the notion of childhood rights reflected in the 
 
 12. See CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. paras. 6-7. 
 13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, art. 16.3, U.N. Doc. A/810  (1948). 
 14. See Programme of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population 
and Development, International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo ‘94), pts. 5.1, 
5.9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13,  (1994), available at http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/reports&doc/ 
icpdpoae.html.  See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the Twenty-Third 
Special Session of the General Assembly: Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing +5), U.N. GAOR, 23rd Special Sess., Supp 
No. 3, pts. 60, 82(c), U.N. Doc. A/S-23/10/Rev. 1, (2000). 
 15. Maria Sophia Aguirre & Ann Wolfgram, United Nations Policy and the Family: 
Redefining the Ties that Bind: A Study of History, Forces and Trends, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 113 n.4. 
(2002).  “This view is clearly reflected in some of the conventions and declarations specifically 
addressing women’s rights and family issues that followed . . . This view was also reflected in the 
Programmes of Action produced by the UN conferences, which include specific chapters 
addressing women, children, and the family, independently of the subject matter of the 
conference.” Id. 
 16. Aguirre & Wolfgram, supra  note 15, at 177. 
Human rights language, understood in the Lockean sense, is limited to individual rights 
and fails to acknowledge the hierarchical and interconnected nature of all rights. . . . The 
family is critical to the maintenance of civil society. . . The home is where human beings 
learn how to live in society; it is where they learn friendship and love for their fellow 
man. . . . The family is multidimensional, material and spiritual, and as such, has the 
capacity to affect every sector of society. . . . International and national policy must begin 
to address these dimensions. . . . Civil society depends on the family for its own health 
and well-being; if policy makers continue to demean or reduce the family and fail to 
address it in its multidimensional character, civil society will necessarily suffer. 
Id. at 177-78. 
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CRC arose.  In such a context, children’s traditional “protection” rights came 
to be overshadowed by “provision” rights, as well as a “totally new right” – an 
autonomous right of “individual personality”—or what some have called the 
right to “participate” in society.17 
In the constitutional culture of the United States, the prevailing attitude was 
(and still is) that the purpose of rights is to insulate and protect people from 
government power.  The only right that makes sense is one that places 
restrictions on government action against individuals.  [These are “first 
generation” rights.] Second generation rights are, in essence, requirements that 
government provide certain benefits and services to the public (such as 
education, work, social security, or culture), and this was deemed incompatible 
with a system of ordered liberty.  Government might (as a political necessity) 
provide such public goods, but they are not legally required to do so. . . . [In 
addition,] many regional institutions have been moving towards recognition of 
new classes of human rights.  Among these are “third generation” rights to 
peace, development and environment.18 
Children, under such burgeoning rights schemes, are now proclaimed to be 
the “equal” of their parents.19  Nevertheless, and despite this new mandate of 
equality, the CRC requires parents and others to develop a child’s “personality, 
 
 17. “[T]here is no doubt whatsoever that the content of the Convention constitutes a major 
leap forward in standard-setting on children’s issues.  On a general level, we can note the 
introduction of ‘participation’ rights which had never before been incorporated in a child-focused 
international instrument.” Nigel Cantwell, The Origins, Development and Significance of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in CRC,TP, supra note 10, at 19, 28. 
 18. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS  97, 102 (2000). 
 19. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 454. 
Not until the early 1970s did the first ‘kiddie libbers’ appear, arguing for the first time that 
the legal rights of minors – children under age eighteen – should be regarded as 
“coextensive with those of adults,” and that children “are autonomous individuals, entitled 
to the same rights and privileges before the law as adults.” Some of the new child 
advocates urged in broadly unrealistic ways the removal of all traditional restraints that 
were based solely on a child’s age – including the removal of minority legal status itself.  
Since that time, some writers have focused their arguments more precisely, advocating a 
shift in the presumption of childhood incapacity.  These writers are urging that the law 
presume children capable of autonomous legal action unless the evidence in an individual 
case shows otherwise (citations omitted). 
Id. at 453.  Perhaps the most prominent advocate of such a shift is Hillary Rodham Clinton.  See, 
e.g., Hillary Rodham, Children’s Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21, 33 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979).  For a 
brief discussion of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s views in this regard, see Jonathan O. Hafen, 
Children’s Rights and Legal Representation – The Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and 
Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423, 431-36 (1993).  Others are more 
willing to presume that young children lack legal capacity, but they have advocated using 
customized, subjective determinations of personal capacity rather than traditional age-based 
classifications. 
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talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential,”20 while 
maintaining the child’s “own cultural identity, language and values.”21  This is 
indeed a tall order and it is small wonder that, in spite of the near-universal 
ratification, agreement upon the value of the Convention’s objectives and 
implementation regime is far from universal. 
In fact, “States Parties are routinely faulted by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child for their failure to fully implement their obligations.”22  
Such failures can arise from criticisms agreeing in principle with our own, 
though different from them in form: 
Whilst there is an international consensus of concern for children, that does not 
mean that there is a consensus about the policies needed to bring about an 
improvement in child welfare.  The experience and perceptions of childhood 
vary fundamentally in different countries, but the Convention assumes a model 
of childhood that is universally applicable “based on the notion that children 
everywhere have the same basic needs and that these can be met with a 
standard set of responses”. . . The Western “protective view of childhood”, as 
Aron Bar-On explains, “has resulted from a combination of circumstances that 
are not part of the experience of most countries of the South”.  This 
construction of childhood arose in the particular circumstances of the Northern 
developed countries . . . Childhood remains a luxury that is unrealisable for the 
majority of the population in developing countries.”23 
According to these critics, because the CRC requires “the universal attainment 
of a modern Western childhood,”24 it may embody a sub silentio judgment that 
Southern societies have violated their children.  Accordingly, the plight of 
children in the South becomes “a sign of the moral failings of their society.  
The imperative of the best interests of the child gives outside agencies the 
legitimacy and powers to intervene. . . .  In other words, the discourse on 
children’s rights infantilizes [and even criminalizes] the South.”25 
The members of the Committee have not been oblivious to such criticisms.   
Accordingly, in 2001, the Committee asserted that: 
Children’s rights are not detached or isolated values devoid of context, but 
exist within a broader ethical framework which is partly described in Article 
 
 20. CRC, supra note 1, art. 29(1)(a). 
 21. CRC supra note 1, art. 29(1)(c). 
 22. Stewart, supra note 4, at n.8. (citing e.g., Concluding Observations on the Initial Report 
of Bulgaria, in Report on the Fourteenth Session, U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 14th 
Sess., paras. 25- 59, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/62 (1997); Concluding Observations on the Initial Report 
of Panama, in id. paras. 98-134. 
 23. Vanessa Pupavac, The Infantilization of the South and the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 2, at 517-18. 
 24. Id. at 518. 
 25. Id. 
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29 (1) and in the Preamble to the Convention.  Many of the criticisms that have 
been made of the Convention are specifically answered by this provision.  
Thus, for example, this article underlines the importance of respect for parents, 
of the need to view rights within their broader ethical, moral, spiritual, cultural 
or social framework, and of the fact that most children’s rights, far from being 
externally imposed, are embedded within the values of local communities.26 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that not all “local communities” are equal in 
“ethical, moral, spiritual, cultural or social framework.”  Thus, the rights 
accorded children worldwide are not uniformly defined and protected.  In the 
United States, the rights of children are guarded by the felt legitimacy of 
deeply rooted traditions of civil order, law and custom.  Children in some other 
nations – we might mention Somalia, for instance – have not been so fortunate.  
Thus, where children are oppressed and endangered, the objectives and 
provisions of the CRC might provide a framework for improvement.27  By 
contrast, in a framework such as the one found in the United States, the CRC is 
an unwelcome and unnecessary intrusion.28 We now turn, then, to a 
consideration of why we find autonomy rights so alarming. 
 
 26. General Comment on the Aims of Education Article 29(1), U.N. Comm. on the Rts. Of 
the Child, para. 7, U.N. Doc CRC/GC/2001/1 (2001). 
 27. We admire, for instance, the two Optional Protocols opened for signature, and quickly 
signed by President Clinton, in mid 2000.  See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res., U.N. Doc.  
A/RES/54/263 (2000) [hereinafter CRCOPAC] The CRCOPAC reinforces the CRC commitment 
to keep children under eighteen out of the armed services, avoids conflict with U.S. practice by 
permitting voluntary recruitment of children under eighteen when accompanied by “a description 
of safeguards . . . adopted to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced.”  Id. art. 3(2).  
Such recruitment is to be “carried out with the informed consent of the person’s parents or legal 
guardians” Id. art. 3(3)(b).  Moreover, article 5 provides that “[n]othing in the present Protocol 
shall be construed as precluding provision in the law of a State Party or in international 
humanitarian law that are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child.”  Id. art. 5.  
Equally admirable is the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child 
Pornography. [hereinafter CRCOPSC].  Though, typically enough, the language of the 
instrument presents a paradox: The introduction to CRCOPSC contains a passage with which 
millions of laboring families, including United States farm families (at least until quite recently) 
might take issue, language recognizing “the right of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the 
child’s education.”  Id. para.2.  See also, id. art. 8(1)(e) (“Protecting, as appropriate, the privacy 
and identity of child victims and taking measures in accordance with national law to avoid the 
inappropriate dissemination of information that could lead to the identification of child victims 
(emphasis added).”). 
 28. See Kevin Mark Smith, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: The 
Sacrifice of American Children on the Altar of Third-World Activism, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 111, 
149 (1998) (which concludes that: 
something must be done to alleviate the plight of the world’s children . . . however, the 
CRC may cause more harm than it prevents . . . Moreover, if an already effective system 
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II.  THE DANGERS OF THE TRULY AUTONOMOUS CHILD 
In this section we will argue that it is not prudent to embrace a document 
that moves toward giving children unprecedented autonomy rights.  Prior to 
the adoption of the CRC, no legal system in the world granted autonomy rights 
to children.29  In fact, legal systems generally limited “children’s autonomy in 
the short run in order to maximize their development of actual autonomy in the 
long run,”30 an approach that “encourages development of the personal 
competence needed to produce an ongoing democratic society comprised of 
persons capable of autonomous and responsible action.”31  To “short-circuit 
this process by legally granting – rather than actually teaching – autonomous 
capacity to children ignores the realities of education and child development to 
the point of abandoning children to a mere illusion of real autonomy.”32 
Children are not autonomous.  They are, by definition, “immature”33 – 
socially, mentally, emotionally, and physically.  Hence, societies keep children 
from driving automobiles, from shooting guns, drinking alcohol, smoking, 
voting, viewing sexually explicit movies and photographs, and entering into 
binding contracts.  Such “deprivations” protect children (and others) from the 
consequences of their immaturity.  Adults impose such limitations not from 
arrogance or cruelty, but from wisdom.  “Children who are pushed into adult 
experience[s] do not become precociously mature.  On the contrary, they cling 
to childhood longer, perhaps all their lives.”34 
[Y]ears of serious struggling with these issues in one of the world’s cultures 
most friendly to ideas about personal autonomy has not persuaded most United 
States courts and legislatures that – short of actual neglect – state agencies (or 
 
of [law within the United States] is preempted by the CRC, state and local governments 
will be unable to respond to protect children’s rights. . . The CRC may be the only viable 
solution to third-world children’s rights abuses.  The United States, however, must not 
sacrifice the welfare of its own children to eliminate such abuses.  The price is simply too 
high.) 
See also, id. at 127, (stating “[t]he United States legal system . . . has already implemented 
protective measures which ensure that children’s rights are enforced.  Adoption of the CRC is 
therefore unnecessary for the enforcement of the rights of American children.”) 
 29. Hafen & Hafen , supra note 5, at 459 (quoting the drafters of the CRC as creating, for 
children, “the ‘totally new right’ of individual personality” independent of parental control).  
 30. Id. at 491. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 9. 
 34. Peter Neubauer, quoted in MARIE WINN, CHILDREN WITHOUT CHILDHOOD ch. 13 
(Pantheon Books 1983), available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/87/41387.html (last visited  
Feb. 18, 2003). 
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children themselves) are better equipped than the nation’s parents to assume 
parental roles.35 
From our point of view, then, the rapid and near universal ratification of 
the CRC more clearly represents a general consensus that children are 
important to the members of the world community than it reflects careful 
consideration of probable consequences of implementing the CRC’s 
provisions.36  While we applaud the CRC for provisions that do much to 
protect children from those who would exploit their vulnerability,37 we cannot 
admire those treaty provisions – notably the “civil rights” provisions, articles 
13-16 – that appear to move away from protecting children and toward 
granting children greater ability to make decisions traditionally reserved for 
adults.  Moreover, any attempt to enforce such provisions in the United States 
must confront a tradition of legal jurisprudence that severely limits the state’s 
ability to intrude upon the family.38 
“Among the fundamental axioms of United States law is the doctrine that 
the parent-child relationship antedates the state just as natural individual rights 
antedate the state in the Constitution’s political theory.”39  United States laws 
that govern aspects of the parent-child relationship focus primarily upon 
 
 35. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 491. 
 36. Id. at 489-90. 
It is quite possible that many members of the international community have simply not 
understood either the CRC’s language or its conceptual novelty.  Given the complexities 
of language translation in an area where nuanced phrasing and subtle legal distinctions are 
at the heart of the arguments, this is a believable interpretation. . . . The surprisingly rapid 
global acceptance of the CRC since 1989 may well have been hastened by two faulty 
assumptions.  One . . . is that the CRC simply restates principles long recognized by the 
United Nations.  The CRC’s own drafters have stated, with some pride, that this is not the 
case.  A second flawed assumption is that the CRC simply reflects contemporary United 
States legal approaches to individuals [sic] rights for children, which implies that the 
United Nations would have been behind the times not to adopt what purported to be an 
enlightened American concept. . . .  Since neither of these significant assumptions is 
correct, there is reason to wonder whether the CRC’s proponents have somehow pulled it 
up by its own bootstraps . . . [T]he CRC’s ideas about child autonomy as a legal rather 
than a merely developmental concept apparently originated in American minds. 
Id. 
 37. See, e.g., CRCOPAC and CRCOPSC, supra note 27. 
 38. GUGGENHEIM ET AL., AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS 
OF FAMILIES 87-92 (Norman Dorsen ed., Southern Illinois University Press 1996) (stating further 
that “children have the right to be raised by their parents free from unjustified interference by 
state officials.” Id. at 87.)  The ACLU handbook also notes that family rights are held in “very 
high esteem.” Id. at 88.  “It might even be said that they command the highest respect of all 
personal rights protected by the Constitution.  The Supreme Court has determined that the right of 
family integrity exists, despite no specific reference to it in the Constitution, among the penumbra 
of other rights protected by the Constitution.”  Id. 
 39. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 449, 462. 
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protecting children from exploitation of their inexperience and incapacity 
rather than upon ensuring that children have an enforceable “right to be left 
alone,” free from parental interference in their choices.40  For this reason, we 
must reject the CRC that, in spite of its restating “many time-honored themes 
about children,” also seeks to “alter United States laws regarding age limits, 
parental rights, and children’s rights to expression, media access, privacy, and 
religion.”41 
A. United States Legal Protection and the CRC 
For two centuries, United States laws have limited the rights given to 
children, not only to protect children from abusive or negligent adults, but also 
to protect children from themselves.42  “To confer the full range of choice 
rights on a child is also to confer the burdens and responsibilities of adult legal 
status, which necessarily removes the protection rights of childhood.”43  The 
United States, therefore, has developed strong legal commitments dedicated to 
protecting children from both the inexperience of youthfulness and the 
exploitations of others.44  Children are limited, for instance, in controlling and 
managing real property, participating in litigation, or in making a will.45  
Children may also disaffirm contracts made during minority, and local 
legislatures may make special provisions governing obscenity.46  Statutory 
rape laws, compulsory school attendance laws, modified standards for tort 
liability, and limitations on activities such as playing video games in public 
game parlors are also designed for the protection of children.47  For good 
reasons, then, United States courts are not willing to recognize that children are 
 
 40. Id. at 452. 
 41. Id. at 449. 
 42. G. Diane Dodson, Legal Rights of Adolescents: Restrictions on Liberty, Emancipation, 
and Status Offenses, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 114, 120 (Robert M. Horowitz and Howard 
A Davidson eds., 1984.) (“[a] number of legal rules are designed to protect society from the 
effects of youthful immaturity, as well as protect the young person him or herself”). 
 43. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 461. 
Choice rights . . . grant individuals the authority to make affirmative and legally binding 
decisions, such as voting, marrying, making contracts, exercising religious preferences, or 
choosing whether and how to be educated.  The very concept of minority status, reflected 
in statutes in every United States jurisdiction, denies underage children independent 
choices on such matters.  This denial is not a way of discriminating against children, but is 
a way of protecting them, and society, from the long-term consequences of a child’s 
immature choices and from exploitation by those who would take advantage of a child’s 
unique vulnerability. 
Id. 
 44. See generally, GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 38. 
 45. See Dodson, supra note 42, at 120. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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empowered with all the liberties that are afforded adults, as we shall explain in 
the sections that follow. 
1. Free Speech and Free Association 
The United States Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York48 held that 
states could constitutionally prohibit the sale of obscene material to minors on 
the basis of its prurient interest to them, regardless of whether the material 
would be obscene to adults.  Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, argued 
that liberty was contingent upon competence: 
I think that a state may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely 
delineated areas, a child – like someone in a captive audience – is not 
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the 
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.  It is only upon such a premise, 
I should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other rights – the right to 
marry, for example, or the right to vote – deprivations that would be 
constitutionally intolerable for adults.49 
By eliminating the choice available for children of whether consume 
obscene materials, the Court in Ginsberg validated local laws that sought to 
protect children from the dangers of exposure to pornography.50  However, the 
belief that pornography is harmful to children is no longer universally held.  
Some child “experts” believe that pornography and even unrestrained sexual 
behavior are good for children.51  Parents and other caregivers who want to 
 
 48. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-638 (1968). 
 49. Id. at 649-50.  But see Gary B. Melton, Children’s Competence to Consent: A Problem 
in Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 9 (Gary B. Melton et al. 
eds., 1983) (arguing that by the Supreme Court claiming minors to be “persons” within the 
meaning of the Constitution, “the Court has opened the door to consideration of the 
circumstances under which minors might rationally be extended the freedom or protection of 
constitutional rights.” However, Melton also recognizes that several Justices on the court have 
found little reason to find that minors are competent to make their own decisions and thus any 
strike change in precedent seems unlikely.  Id. at 9). 
 50. See Corinne Sweet, Pornography and Addiction: A Political Issue 179, 191-192 and 
Edna F. Einsiedel, The Experimental Research Evidence: Effects of Pornography on the 
“Average Individual” 248, 248 in PORNOGRAPHY: WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A 
RADICAL NEW VIEW (Catherine Itzin ed., 1993).  Einsiedel documents several studies that show 
negative effects of pornography on the average male and female. 
 51. See, e.g., Anne Hendershott, The Paradox of the Postmodern Pedophile, THE SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, April 26, 2002 at B-9, (noting that the coming publication of JUDITH 
LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX (2002) by the 
University of Minnesota Press promises a “a radical, refreshing and long overdue reassessment of 
how we think and act about children’s and teens’ sexuality.” In published interviews on the 
University of Minnesota’s web site, author Judith Levine decries the fact that there are people 
“pushing a conservative religious agenda that would deny minors access to sexual expression” 
and adds that “[w]e do have to protect children from real dangers. . . . But that doesn’t mean 
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counter such attitudes—who want to protect children by restraining their 
access to potentially harmful sexual practices and pornographic materials—
could be undermined by the broadly worded language of CRC article 13, 
granting children “the right to freedom of expression,” including the right to 
“seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers . . . through any other media of the child’s choice.”52 
The language of article 13 seems, therefore, to empower children with 
potential rights incompatible with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
Chief Justice Burger in Parham v. J.R.53 observed that “[m]ost children, even 
in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many 
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.  Parents can and 
must make those judgments.”54 
In addition to article 13’s broad grant of power, CRC article 16 demands 
that “[n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
or her privacy, family, home or correspondence. . .”55  This article, alone and 
or in conjunction with article 13, could raise problems for parents and schools 
wishing to control children’s access topornography—among other things—on 
the Internet.  By preventing “unlawful interference” with a child’s “privacy,” 
article 16 has the potential to place the basic ability to discipline and monitor 
children – activities necessary for effective parenting – into serious doubt.  The 
CRC does include article 17, which asks participating countries to include 
information that protects children from “injurious material,” and it opposes 
sexual abuse in article 19.56  However, the broad references made in article 13 
seem to have a tenuous relationship, at best, with any restrictive language that 
could be found in these other articles.57 
In cases dealing with children’s rights to freedom of association, United 
States courts have collectively permitted laws that regulate young persons’ 
access to pool halls, bowling alleys, dance halls, and videogame arcades.58  An 
Illinois court found that restrictions on video games were permissible in light 
of the evidence that such games could lead to “modeling of antisocial behavior 
and deindividuation and hence to an increased propensity for delinquent 
behavior.”59  The United States Supreme Court in City of Dallas v. Stenglin60 
 
protecting some fantasy of their sexual innocence.”  The interview is available at 
http://www.upress.umn.edu/HarmfultoMinorsQandA.html). 
 52. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 13. 
 53. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
 54. Id. 
 55. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 16. 
 56. Id. art. 19; see also Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 469. 
 57. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 469. 
 58. See Dodson, supra note 42, at 131-34. 
 59. Id. at 133. 
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upheld a local ordinance that prevented young people between the ages of 
fourteen and seventeen from mixing with older persons in dance halls.61  CRC 
article 15, on the other hand, ensures a child’s right of association and peaceful 
assembly.62 
2. Religion 
In 1972 the Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder,63 ruling a law which 
required parents to send their children to school until age sixteen violated 
Amish parents’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The Court found for 
the parents’ right to remove their children from school in accordance with their 
Amish beliefs that children are best served by leaving school upon completion 
of the eighth grade.  Only Justice Douglas dissented: “[i]t is the student’s 
judgment, not his parents’ that is essential if . . . [students are] to be masters of 
their own destiny.”64  Ironically, this statement from Justice Douglas’s dissent 
is the oft-cited view of child autonomy advocates.65  Based on this minority 
view, these advocates have tenuously (although successfully) asserted “the 
right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”66 
American law, of course, protects children who may be forced by their 
parents to participate in activities that could be harmful or exploitative.67  But 
religious training in the home is a powerful tool, valued by a great many 
parents as a way to teach children essential principles of morality and ethics.  
Allowing children to decide their religious upbringing completely for 
themselves risks leaving them to the moral and ethical training of the schools 
and their peers.  This is an outcome that is unacceptable to a great many 
American parents, incompatible with United States jurisprudence, and 
disharmonious with the assertions of the Preamble to the CRC itself.68 
 
 60. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1989). 
 61. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 469-70. 
 62. CRC, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
 64. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
 65. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 471. 
 66. CRC, supra note 1, art. 14. 
 67. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 159 (1944) (upholding children labor laws, when 
the child, a Jehovah’s Witness, was selling religious tracts under the supervision of her 
custodian). 
 68. CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. paras. 6-7, (stating, 
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, 
should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its 
responsibilities within the community, Recognizing that the child, for the full and 
harmonious, development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding . . . ) 
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3. Privacy 
At common law, consent of the parents, either express or implied, is 
necessary to authorize medical treatment of a minor.69  One possible reason for 
this rule was that parents were considered to know best when their child was 
injured or suffering and was in need of medical attention.  Although most 
states have codified a common-law exception allowing doctors to treat children 
in emergency situations,70 it is still generally recognized that children need a 
parent’s consent before they may seek medical assistance.  Besides emergency 
situations, United States courts have not recognized a child’s right of privacy 
except in two limited circumstances – abortion and birth control.71 
However, even in finding that children are free to make their own 
decisions concerning abortion, both Justices Powell and Stewart, as part of the 
majority in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,72 were concerned with whether 
or not to bear a child “is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under 
emotional stress, may be ill equipped to make it without mature advice and 
emotional support. 
It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from 
the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant 
minors frequently take place.”73 
Moreover, while the Court has taken the unusual step of granting 
reproductive rights to children, Professor Hafen has observed that: 
[t]his difference arises primarily from the extraordinary circumstance that a 
pregnant minor is herself a prospective parent who would not require parental 
consent to place her child for adoption.  Therefore, the rationale for abortion-
related privacy has no serious application to a minor’s other choice rights and 
is a genuine exception to the courts’ recognition of parental authority in 
virtually all other environments.74 
 
Id. 
 69. See HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 42, at 136.  Horowitz explains that at common 
law any “unconsented touching, including touching for treatment [without parent’s consent] or 
examination, is a battery;” the only exceptions to this rule were limited to emergency situations.  
Id. at 136-37. 
 70. Id. at 140. 
 71. See Hafen & Hafen, supra  note 5, at 473 (Professor Hafen explains that in Carey v. 
Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the “Court’s purpose was not to authorize a 
maturity-based “choice” right, but to protect immature adolescents against the risks of pregnancy 
and venereal disease.”). 
 72. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 89-91 (1976). 
 73. Id. at 91.  Justice Stevens also joined the four-member dissent and supported a parental 
consent form for abortions as a means of ensuring “that the decision be made correctly and with 
full understanding of the consequences of either alternative.”  Id. at 103. 
 74. See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 473. 
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Nevertheless, granting autonomy rights even of a “child/parent” raises an 
interesting observation: children need parental consent to obtain something as 
simple as dental braces, yet no consent is necessary for abortions.75 
Unfortunately, the CRC fails to recognize the seeming absurdity of the 
above, and, without the concern expressed by Justices Powell and Stewart in 
Danforth, has granted broad privacy rights to adolescents and children.  Article 
16 states that “[n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence.”76  Some 
supporters believe that CRC article 16 grants the same right to “protections for 
procreation and abortion decision-making” as those that are afforded to 
adults.77  Hence, there will continue to be heated debates at UN Conferences 
about granting sexual autonomy and abortion rights to children, a position that 
(oddly enough) is supported by the same individuals that one might expect to 
decry the sexual abuse of children.78  These ideological battles, however, 
should not lose sight of the reality that most child-development experts have 
long believed that “adolescent sexual activity is . . . unhealthy for children – 
emotionally, psychologically, spiritually, and physically.”79 
B. The Need for Parental Authority 
In the course of the discussions over the role of the CRC and the debate 
over protecting children versus granting them broad autonomy rights, an 
important question arises: Whose needs are being served by the outcomes 
sought?  As Professor Hafen has observed, “[s]ome of the adults who want to 
liberate children seem motivated not primarily by children’s actual interests 
but by their own interests, some ideological and some that merely serve adult 
convenience.”80 
Perhaps it goes without saying that of paramount importance in all actions 
concerning children is a child’s “best interests,” a notion made explicit in the 
CRC.81  But who, under the CRC scheme, decides what are a child’s “best 
interests”?  Parents are to be supported by States Parties in their “rights and 
duties . . . to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a 
manner consistent with [the child’s] evolving capacities.”82  How are parents to 
 
 75. Id. at 473-76. 
 76. CRC, supra note 1, art. 16. 
 77. Robert E. Shepherd, Civil Rights of the Child, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN AMERICA 143 
(1990). 
 78. See, e.g., Hendershott, supra note 51. 
 79. Henry J. Redd et al., Contraception and Adolescents: A Dissent, in 21 CHILD & FAMILY 
105, 106 (Herbert Ratner ed., No. 2, 1990). 
 80. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 478. 
 81. CRC, supra note 1, at art. 3(1). 
 82. CRC, supra note 1, art. 14(2). 
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evaluate an “evolving capacity”?  What if they make a mistake?  What if a 
parent’s notion of “best interests” conflicts with the notions of the Committee 
of “ten experts” elected to “examin[e] the progress made by States Parties in 
achieving the realization of the obligations undertaken in the present 
Convention”?83 
Perhaps most importantly, how and under what authority are States Parties 
to provide “support” for parental endeavors?  Increasingly, the State, in the 
new transnational world, is falling under the spell of “soft law,” the influence 
of non-state interest groups seeking to change national and international norms, 
often by making end-runs around existing “hard law” (i.e., constitutional 
provisions, statutes, or case law).84  Such behavior had an incalculable impact, 
in fact, upon the drafting of the CRC itself.85 
Ironically enough, participants from the United States were a major 
influence in the Convention’s drafting, as “American children’s rights 
advocates took the lead in developing the CRC’s unique provisions for child 
autonomy”86 and, in fact, “participated actively in the ten years of intense 
multilateral negotiations that led to the consensus adoption of the 
Convention”87 in 1989.  Such participation, coupled with the United States’ 
refusal to ratify the resulting document, is a source of confusion, perhaps even 
 
 83. CRC, supra note 1, art. 43(1, 2). 
 84. Aguirre & Wolfgram, supra note 15, at 119-20. 
The changing definition of family in UN documents has been significantly influenced by 
non-state actors interacting through transnational advocacy networks, with each other, 
with states, and with international organizations.  These non-state actors have become 
significant players in international policy-making and consequently in the creation of soft 
law.  The legal scholars Abbot and Snidal note that “soft law” is often highly influential 
and is often treated by interested actors as if it were hard law.  Such has been the case 
with the documents produced by the UN conferences in the last two decades:  “[A]iming 
for soft law bases for new norms is a preferred strategy [of civil societies at the UN] 
because its status in the international political system is so ambiguous . . . Thus, soft law 
is the preferred tool for those who want to change norms. 
Id.; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 18, at 96. 
 85.  
It is generally acknowledged in the international community that the NGOs had a direct 
and indirect impact on this Convention that is without parallel in the history of drafting 
international agreements. . . .  The extent of the overall NGO contribution is . . . by no 
means always clear from the travaux préparatoires.  The success of the NGO’s activities 
to promote support for the Convention was, for example, undoubtedly instrumental in 
getting many governments to take the drafting process more seriously . . . .  [R]eviewing 
the final text of the Convention, the Ad Hoc Group was able to identify at least thirteen 
substantive articles or paragraphs for whose inclusion in the text the NGOs had been 
primarily responsible. 
Cantwell, supra note 17, at 19. 
 86. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 449. 
 87. Stewart, supra note 4, at 162. 
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frustration, among international observers who believed the erroneous 
assertions by some American advocates “that the CRC simply restates 
traditionally accepted protections for children and that their positions reflect 
the current state of United States law.”88  However, the CRC drafters’ 
approach, in fact, 
confuses children’s needs for nutrition, education, and protection (with which 
the United Nations has historically, and wisely, been concerned) with 
children’s alleged right to make autonomous choices.  Such confusion can 
undermine children’s most basic needs.  The drafters evidently wished to use 
avant-garde terminology that seems to place the United Nations on the cutting 
edge of human rights thinking, but they have failed to see the distinction 
between the applications of that terminology to adults and its applications to 
children.89 
Whatever the motives for the behavior, “[t]he new adult willingness to 
defer to children’s preferences has occurred in the absence of empirical 
evidence demonstrating that today’s children actually possess greater capacity 
[than children of the past] to assume the risks and responsibilities of making 
autonomous choices.”90  Indeed there appears to be some evidence to the 
contrary: Children with increased autonomy typically do not make better 
choices. 
In the area of marriage choice, for example, Professor Lynn D. Wardle has 
observed that age restrictions on marriage have a direct correlation to marital 
stability: “Age restrictions are widely considered necessary to prevent 
immature persons from entering marriages that are likely to fail.  Marriage 
restrictions are believed to protect the individuals involved from the traumas of 
 
 88. Hafen & Hafen, supra note 5, at 460. 
 89. Id. at 486. 
 90. See id. at 478 (also stating that 
[i]t is therefore natural to wonder whose interests are being served by the resurgence of 
interest in liberation and autonomy for children reflected in the CRC and in today’s 
cultural echoes of CRC themes.  Some of the adults who want to liberate children seem 
motivated not primarily by children’s actual interests but by their own interests, some 
ideological and some that merely serve adult convenience.  Because the tutorial yoke 
between adults and children is a mutual one, adults face a beguiling conflict of interest in 
thinking about autonomy for children.  When they disengage from the arduous task of 
rearing and teaching children in the purported name of increasing those children’s 
freedom, adults’ actual – even if not fully conscious – purpose may be to increase their 
own freedom by liberating themselves from the burdens of providing meaningful 
education and child care.  Worse yet some pro-child autonomy claims may be essentially 
a façade intended to protect the interests of adults who profit from such claims while 
indirectly exploiting the actual interests of children. 
Id. at 478-479. 
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divorce and to protect society from the burdens of broken families.”91  In fact, 
some studies find that “couples who marry young are overrepresented in 
divorce actions, and tend to break up sooner than other marriages.”92  Most at 
risk for divorce are men who marry between fourteen and nineteen years of age 
and women who marry between fourteen and seventeen.93  It is the rare child 
who is equipped to face the weighty and lonely decisions that come with 
adolescent marriage. 
Indeed, it may be asserted that there is a need within the international 
community to rediscover the virtues of parental authority.  Marriage and 
parenthood, as understood and practiced for centuries, have marked benefits 
for marital partners and their offspring.  A growing body of research shows 
that traditional heterosexual marriage has significant benefits for adults94 as 
well as for their children.  For example, children living with their biological 
parents have significant advantages in education,95 suffer less from poverty,96 
 
 91. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 2002). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 3 (1998).  “Married people are 
generally healthier; they live longer, earn more, have better mental health and better sex lives, and 
are happier than their unmarried counterparts.  Furthermore, married individuals have lower rates 
of suicide, fatal accidents, acute and chronic illnesses, alcoholism, and depression than other 
people.”  Id.  
 95. Studies consistently show that children in an intact natural family are significantly less 
likely to drop out of high school than children in a one-parent family.  See Linda J. Waite, Does 
Marriage Matter? 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 494 (1995).  In some studies, the likelihood of 
dropping out more than doubles for children in single-parent households.  Id. at 494.  Importantly, 
Waite notes that the statistics regarding the likelihood of dropping out of school for children of 
single-parent households, “take into account differences in a number of characteristics that affect 
educational attainment,” thus accentuating the accuracy of the statistics’ indications.  Id.  
Children of non-traditional families are also more likely to have lower grades and other measures 
of academic achievement.  See Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of 
the Amato and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis 15 J. OF FAM. PSYCHOL., 355, 365 (2001); see also 
William H. Jeynes, The Effects of Several of the Most Common Family Structures on the 
Academic Achievement of Eighth Graders, 30 MARRIAGE AND FAM. REV., 73, 84 (2001).  Finally, 
children of divorced parents are more likely to have lower occupational status and earnings and 
have increased rates of unemployment.  See generally Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky, 
Parental Divorce, Life-Course Disruption, and Adult Depression, 61 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
FAM. 1034, 1040, 1043 (1999).  
 96. Studies show that children raised outside marriage are more likely to be raised in poor 
economic conditions.  See Waite, supra note 95, at 494.  Even after controlling for race and 
family backgrounds, children raised outside of marriage suffer not only from economic 
deprivations, but also from a lack of parental attention and from high rates of residential 
relocation, all of which can work to disadvantage the child’s development.  See Pamela J. Smock 
et al., The Effect of Marriage and Divorce on Women’s Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. SOC. REV., 
794, 805, 810 (1999); see also Ross Finnie, Women Men and the Economic Consequences of 
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commit fewer crimes,97 and are better adjusted socially than children living in 
single-parent homes or step-parent homes.98 
These benefits do not flow from the beneficent impact of some 
governmental action or bureaucracy.  Research demonstrates that these 
benefits flow directly from well-functioning, two-parent households.99 
Therefore, except in those cases where it can be shown that parents are 
incapable or incompetent to perform their important roles as protectors and 
mentors of their children, they should have full authority to make the decisions 
that most affect the daily lives of their children.  While many international 
proposals that interfere with (or even eliminate) parental authority are well-
intentioned, no local, national or international agency can make decisions for 
children that are superior to those made by a reasonably well functioning two-
parent family.  However well-intentioned, no international law – including the 
CRC – should be construed so as to deprive parents of the authority to 
determine, on their own, what is in the best interests of their children. 
 
Divorce: Evidence from Canadian Longitudinal Data, 30 CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. AND 
ANTHROP., 205 (1993) (finding that the presence of two parents potentially means more parental 
supervision and more parental time helping with homework).  
 97. Adolescents with married parents are least likely to use marijuana, cocaine, or smoke 
cigarettes.  PATRICK FAGAN ET AL., THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE: A BOOK OF CHARTS 
35-36, 38 (The Heritage Foundation 2002).  Children with non-traditional family structures are 
twice as likely to use marijuana or cocaine and are 30 percent more likely to have experimented 
with cigarettes than children with two biological parents.  Id. 
 98. “[C]hildren of divorce do not accept monitoring or supervision from live-in partners 
nearly as much as they do from married parents.” Sanford M. Dornbusch et al., Single 
Parenthood, 33 SOC’Y 30 (1996).  Young women from single-parent households are more likely 
to give birth out of wedlock, and young adults are more likely both to be out of school and the 
labor force.  See Waite, supra note 94, at 494.  Furthermore, “children who spend part of their 
childhood in a single-parent family . . . report significantly lower-quality relationships with their 
parents as adults and have less frequent contact with them.”  Id. at 495 (citing Diane N. Lye et al., 
Childhood Living Arrangements and Adult Children’s Relations with Their Parents, 32 
DEMOGRAPHY 261, 271-72 (1995)).  Children of fragmented or divorced families are also more 
likely to commit suicide and have higher risks of obtaining mental illnesses.  See WILLIAM J. 
DOHERTY ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY ONE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 14-15 (Center for the American Experiment Coalition for Marriage, Family and 
Couples Education Institute for American Values 2002) (stating that high rates of family 
fragmentation are associated with an increased risk of suicide among both adults and adolescents.  
Id.) In the last half-century, suicide rates among teens and young adults have tripled.  David M. 
Cutler et al., National Bureau of Economic Research, Explaining the Rise of Youth Suicide, 
Working Paper 7713 at 37, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7713.pdf (last visited Feb. 
23, 2003).  The single “most important of these variables is the female divorce rate. . . [the] effect 
is large . . . [as it] can explain as much as two-thirds of the increase of youth suicides.” Id. 
 99. See supra notes 94-96. 
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III.  WHY CONGRESS LACKS THE POWER TO RATIFY THE CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
To this point, we have examined the competition between the conception 
of “human rights” that undergirds the CRC and some long-held notions about 
the actual “best interests” of the world’s children.  We now turn to the second 
of our major arguments: however well or illogically grounded in international 
human rights theory and practice, the United States Congress lacks the power 
to impress the CRC upon the constituent sovereignties collectively known as 
the United States of America. 
Professor David Stewart, formerly Assistant Legal Adviser for Human 
Rights and Refugees in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. State 
Department, summarized the situation in 1998: “[S]ome Convention provisions 
arguably pose questions when compared with U.S. law and practice.  Some 
provisions specify substantive rights that are thus far unknown as legally 
enforceable rights in U.S. law.  Some provisions express rights protected under 
U.S. law, but appear to mandate steps beyond what the United States is able, or 
willing, to do.”100 Such issues, suggests Professor Stewart, might be explored 
and resolved as part of the debate over United States ratification of the CRC.  
He further suggests a series of “innovative” approaches to implementation and 
enforcement of Convention provisions.101 
However, under the provisions of the Constitution, Congress has power to 
pass federal laws binding the states only in certain limited circumstances.  
Such power most often has been invoked under the auspices of Article I, 
 
 100. Stewart, supra note 4, at 172. 
 101. Id.  at 183-84. 
One hurdle to U.S. implementation of this aspect of the Convention at a meaningful level 
is conceptual.  Traditionally, United States society has not regarded economic and social 
benefits as legally required or enforceable “rights” but rather as discretionary services or 
programs that may be amended or rescinded solely on the basis of political or budgetary 
considerations.  The Convention has been viewed by some as calling for substantial new 
programs for children with significant resource implications.  It is not entirely clear, for 
example, how the federal government could or would effectively guarantee the right of 
every child in the country “to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” 
or “to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and 
social well-being,” but some steps must necessarily be taken to achieve the goals.  
Difficult decisions will need to be made regarding the level of resource commitments to 
be devoted to implementing the Convention, how and by whom they will be funded, and 
who will administer delivery.  In some areas, this may require provision of new services.  
Even where programs do provide services for care, protection, and support at state levels, 
more than a few are underfunded, poorly staffed and overburdened.  There is little 
question, for example, that additional steps to improve health care delivery to the least 
fortunate, and to reduce the infant mortality rate, would be entirely consistent with the 
objectives of the Convention. 
Id. 
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section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, commonly known as the “Commerce 
Clause.” Commerce Clause Jurisprudence has been a controversial field, at 
times approving the venturing of Congress into areas only obliquely related to 
actual interstate commerce.102 Most recently, however, the Supreme Court has 
retreated from a broad application of the clause, and in the interest of 
preserving state and federal distinctions, has declined to find legitimate 
extension of Commerce Clause power into areas not directly related to 
interstate commerce. 
A. An Overview of Commerce Power Jurisprudence 
Congress lacks the power to ratify the CRC because the provisions of the 
Convention are outside the commerce power, as presently conceived.  
Commerce Clause jurisprudence springs from the 1824 case of Gibbons v. 
Ogden,103 in which Chief Justice Marshall offered the first definition of 
Congress’s power to regulate “the commercial intercourse between nations, 
and parts of nations,”104 thus describing the “Federal commerce power with a 
breadth never yet exceeded.”105  (Significantly, Gibbons also articulated the 
notion that “state laws must yield to federal laws with which they conflict.”)106 
Nevertheless, even this expansive interpretation of congressional power 
has limits.  Those limits, were reached in the 1995 decision of United States v. 
Lopez.107  In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zone Act, 
which made it a “federal offense ‘for any individual knowingly to possess a 
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, 
is a school zone.’”108  The Court found three distinct areas that Congress may 
regulate under the commerce power:  (1) channels of interstate commerce, (2) 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) “those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce.”109  The Lopez Court scrutinized 
the legislation under the third category and held it to be unconstitutional 
because, in part, the statute was “not an essential part of a larger regulation of 
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economic activity.”110  The Court thus established a new standard for 
Commerce Clause interpretation. 
This new standard, however, has deep roots.  The Lopez analysis reiterates 
a long-standing constitutional limitation on congressional power.  Citing James 
Madison, the Court noted “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are 
to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”111  
Madison’s clear assertion that the states reserved all the powers not specifically 
delegated to the federal government supports the Lopez view that commerce 
power has real limitations.  Especially in lawmaking areas traditionally left to 
individual states, the federal government has no power to create law.112 
The majority in Lopez acknowledged that the new standard might create 
legal uncertainty, but concluded that legal uncertainty is more palatable than 
ceding limitless power to Congress, thereby forfeiting the scheme of 
enumerated powers and separate levels of government that are fundamental to 
a federal system.113  In such a decentralized system, each level of government, 
federal and state, will exercise authority over certain delimited areas.114  The 
elimination of any restraint on commerce power would “effectually obliterate 
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a 
completely centralized government.”115 
The line drawn in Lopez was reaffirmed just three years ago in United 
States v. Morrison.116  In Morrison, the Court invalidated the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994, which announced that all persons within the United 
States “shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by 
gender.”117  To enforce that right, the Act provided that a woman who was a 
victim of such a crime could bring a civil suit against the perpetrator in federal 
court.118  The Court held the statute unconstitutional for the same reasons as in 
Lopez. 
First, the activity being regulated was essentially non-economic.  In fact, 
the Court bluntly stated that violence against women is not “in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity.”119  More importantly, the Court asserted that 
holding the statute valid would disrupt the national and local distinction: “The 
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Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is 
truly local. . . . The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not 
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate 
commerce has always been the province of the States.”120  If the statute in 
question in Morrison had passed constitutional muster, Congress arguably 
could regulate any activity as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that 
activity has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or 
consumption.121  This the Court pointedly refused to do. 
B. The CRC Violates Current Commerce Clause Interpretation. 
The CRC embodies substantive policy determinations well beyond the 
limits of congressional power under Lopez and Morrison.  If Congress lacks 
the power to bar handguns from the vicinity of schools or to create a federal 
civil remedy for violent acts against women, it certainly lacks power to enact 
laws that regulate intra-familial relationships.  Under the Lopez and Morrison 
interpretation of the commerce power, Congress simply lacks authority to 
demand the substantive outcomes that the CRC envisions. 
The CRC does not involve channels or instrumentalities of commerce.  In 
fact, the terms of the CRC, and specifically those in articles 13, 14, and 15, 
have no commercial impetus whatsoever.  Article 13 provides freedom of 
expression.122 Article 14 provides freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion.123  Article 15 grants children freedom of association and of peaceful 
assembly.124  These “rights” as guaranteed under the CRC are socially and 
politically based and do not deal with interstate commerce.  The terms of the 
CRC are not “commercial” in nature, nor do they deal with any “economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”125  The CRC thus 
fails all three levels of analysis under the Lopez test. 
Moreover, the ratification of a binding international treaty by creating 
federal law where traditionally local governments have legislated would most 
assuredly disrupt the national and local distinction that the Constitution of the 
United States has firmly established.  Traditionally, all family law matters have 
been reserved to the States to legislate.126  Federal imposition into such matters 
violates the balance of state and federal powers as outlined in the Tenth 
Amendment.  CRC article 27 specifically admonishes State Parties to provide 
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for minors’ “physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.”127  
Morrison specifically expressed the Court’s concern that, if States were 
relieved of their traditional legislative responsibilities, federal legislation could 
be applied “equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state 
regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on 
the national economy is undoubtedly significant.”128 
There is, notwithstanding the current strain of commerce power case law, 
the possibility that the Court could consider the ratification of the Convention 
constitutional under the now-discredited reasoning of Missouri v. Holland.129  
In Holland, the Court held that a treaty negotiated between the United States 
and Great Britain created congressional power to regulate the hunting of 
migratory fowl where no such power existed before.  Justice Holmes reasoned 
that a treaty might override constitutional limits flowing from the Commerce 
Clause or the Tenth Amendment because the national interest of protecting 
migratory birds was of the “first magnitude.”130  It is conceivable that the 
Supreme Court – in reliance on Missouri v. Holland – could declare that 
children’s rights are of “first magnitude” importance and, therefore, are 
enforceable despite and whatever the terms and limitations of the United States 
Constitution. 
We do not believe, however, that such a result is likely.  Missouri v. 
Holland created a constitutional crisis and provoked an intense and heated 
congressional debate over a proposed constitutional amendment (the “Bricker 
Amendment”), which would have expressly subjugated treaty provisions to 
constitutional limits.131  The controversy surrounding Missouri v. Holland and 
the Senator Bricker’s proposed amendment was calmed only in 1957 – almost 
forty years after Holland – by Justice Black’s famous dictum in Reid v. Covert 
that “treaties must comply with the constitution.”132 
At this point in world history, we do not believe the Court will again walk 
down the path marked by Missouri v. Holland toward the notion that Congress 
can circumvent constitutional limitations (such as those announced in the 
recent commerce clause cases) by ratifying inconsistent treaties.  Under the 
Court’s current interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the policy judgments 
set out in the CRC are clearly beyond congressional reach.  The aims of the 
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CRC are laudable, but in its current form, the treaty violates the very language 
of the Constitution itself. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have questioned the legitimacy and wisdom of the rights 
announced by the CRC.  We join, however, in the conviction 
that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly 
children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it 
can fully assume its responsibilities within the community, [and recognize] 
that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her 
personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding.133 
We assert that, for the protection of the family, parents and children in the 
United States can look to rights already discovered and domestic policies 
already in place for the implementation and protection of those rights.  
Ratifying the CRC would threaten, not enhance, the integrity of these policies. 
We find most troubling the CRCs extension of autonomy rights to 
children.  In our view, this represents, at least in part, a self-interested 
abrogation of the responsibility of adults to care for and protect children. 
 Fortunately, the Constitution of the United States stands as a conceptual 
and institutional barrier to the universal ratification of the CRC.  In spite of the 
fact that the CRC exists in large part due to the efforts of certain citizens and 
citizen groups from the United States, these efforts are inconsistent with the 
commands of the Constitution.  Thus, while discussion of the ratification of the 
CRC is academically and philosophically interesting, it is legally irrelevant. 
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